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Abstract
We study the impact of international R&D outsourcing on the probability of innovating. 
We find that this influence is positive, particularly for exporters. We show that
international and national outsourcing are substitutes as determinants of process 
innovation in low-tech and medium low-tech sectors.
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11. Introduction
Recently, some authors have raised concerns about the erosion of national 
competencies and high-skilled jobs due to international R&D outsourcing1. However, 
R&D outsourcing can allow companies to specialize in core knowledge-intensive tasks, 
thereby freeing up resources for critical research2. Moreover, in sectors with rapid 
technological change, companies may see international outsourcing as complementary 
to their national outsourcing in order to obtain unique knowledge in little time. A 
possible consequence, which we investigate in this paper, is that international R&D 
outsourcing increases national innovativeness. We focus on two issues: (i) the impact of 
international R&D outsourcing on the likelihood of innovating; and (ii) the 
complementarity or substitutability between international and national outsourcing to 
innovate3. We differentiate between exporters and non-exporters. This distinction is 
important because for exporters, international R&D outsourcing can play a crucial role 
in adapting their products to foreign tastes and standards (e.g. Braga and Willmore, 
1991), and monitoring costs can be lower than for non-exporters4. Our investigation is 
based on a panel dataset of Spanish companies, which we describe in Section 2.
In Section 3 we present our main results. We find that the influence of a firm’s
international R&D outsourcing on its probability of innovating is positive but its impact
differs between types of companies. Given the observed patterns between outsourcing 
and innovation, we find that international and national outsourcing are substitutes but 
only for process innovation in low-tech and medium low-tech sectors. In the concluding 
section we discuss this finding.
                                               
1 See Thursby and Thursby (2006) for references, as well as for a study of types of R&D outsourcing.
2 For studies that analyze the importance and determinants of technology sourcing, see Cesaroni (2004), 
Chung and Yeaple (2008), Miozzo and Grimshaw (2005), and Ito et al. (2007). For a study on the positive 
relationship between outsourcing and technological change, see for example Bartel et al. (2008).  
3 We use a similar approach than Mohnen and Röller (2005).
4 For example Lewis and Sappington (1991) emphasis the importance of a firm’s monitoring capabilities 
in order to decide to subcontract its production.
22. Data and methodology
Our dataset comes from a survey of innovating Spanish firms (Panel de 
Innovación Tecnológica, PITEC)5 for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006. We have 
information for a panel of approximately 11,600 firms every year. 
The main interest of our analysis consists of testing the impact of international
R&D outsourcing on a firm’s likelihood of innovating, and the complementarity 
between outsourcing locations in low-tech or medium low-tech and high-tech or 
medium high-tech sectors (to classify sectors, we follow the Eurostat/OECD 
classification, 2007). We distinguish between exporters and non-exporters. Our 
dependent variables are two dummy variables: firms’ product, and process innovations,
denoted by py , and cy , in the equations below. These variables take the value 1 if a firm 
reports having introduced new or significantly improved products, or production 
processes, respectively. In order to account for the potential correlation between 
disturbances of product and process innovations, we estimate (by maximum likelihood)
a bivariate probit model (e.g., Greene, 1993, Chapter 21) for the following two 
innovation equations. We drop company and year indexes to simplify the notation.
1   if    * ' ' 0,   0  otherwise, p p p p p py y x z y        (1)
1    if    * ' ' 0,   0  otherwise,c c c c c cy y x z y        (2)
   0,    Var =Var 1,    Cov[ , ] ,p c p c p cE E               
0,0 0,1 1,0 1,1 0,0 1,1with   ( ,  ,  ,  ,  ,..., ),  
e e e e n nx x x x x x x ,0,0 ,0,1 ,1,0 ,1,1 ,0,0 ,1,1( ,  ,  ,  ,  ,..., ). e e e e n ni i i i i i i       The
superindex e denotes exporters, n denotes non-exporters, and  ,i p c . The vector x
denotes dummy variables of various forms of R&D outsourcing explained below, z is a 
vector of control variables,  and  are vectors of coefficients. 
                                               
5 The Spanish National Institute of Statistics constructs this database on the basis of the annual Spanish 
responses to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS).
3Our main independent variables are measures of international and national R&D 
outsourcing. The company reports its external R&D expenditures, that is, its purchases 
of R&D outside the firm in Spain and abroad. With this information, we define eight
dummy variables. We distinguish companies with only national R&D outsourcing, 
denoted by 0,1
kx , companies with only international R&D outsourcing, denoted by 1,0
kx , 
companies with both national and international R&D outsourcing, denoted by 1,1
kx , and 
companies with no outsourcing, denoted by 0,0
kx ; where 
 (exporters),   (non-exporters)k e n . In order to avoid simultaneity problems, we include
these dummy variables with a one-period lag6. As controls (which we call z) we include
proxies of internal R&D, and obstacles to innovating that have been shown to be 
important in hampering innovation (Mohnen and Röller, 2005, and Mohnen et al., 
2008)7.
We consider that two inputs are complements (substitutes) if an increase in one 
input increases (decreases) the returns to using more of the other (Topkis, 1998). This 
happens if the production function is supermodular (submodular) with respect to the 
inputs. Following this approach, national and international outsourcing are complements 
if the following restriction holds:
,1,1 ,0,1 ,1,0 ,0,0
k k k k
i i i i      , (3)
                                               
6 This reduces our sample to a two year panel. Note that we do not control for firm fixed effects because 
some of the independent variables, including national R&D outsourcing, have little variability during the 
two year period that we analyze given the available data.
7 We include three types of obstacles to innovating: Lack of funds within the firm or from sources outside 
the firm or innovation costs were too high; Lack of information on technology or on markets; and Lack of 
personnel. For each of the factors, the company answers that its importance was high, intermediate, low, 
or not relevant. We assign a number that varies from zero to three for each answer. We calculate the 
average importance of the cost factors at the firm level minus the sector’s average importance to reduce 
the potential bias caused if respondents give similar answers for all factors. The complete list of control 
variables can be seen in Table 1.
4consequently, if ,1,1 ,0,1 ,1,0 ,0,0
k k k k
i i i i      , then these two inputs are substitutes8. The left-
hand side of these inequalities measures the marginal impact of international 
outsourcing on innovation if the firm outsources nationally, and the right-hand side 
measures the marginal impact of international outsourcing on innovation if the firm 
does not outsource nationally. If inequality (3) holds, then international R&D 
outsourcing reinforces the effect of national outsourcing on innovation. 
We define ,1,1 ,0,1 ,1,0 ,0,0
k k k k k
i i i i i        . We estimate ki and its 95% confidence 
interval. We calculate the p-value for the null hypothesis of equality. If we reject the 
null hypothesis, and ki is negative with a confidence interval entirely in the negative
range, then we accept substitutability. These tests require that we estimate (1) and (2) 
without constant terms.
3. Results
In Table 1, we report the descriptive statistics of the main independent variables, 
the estimation results, and the tests. Starting with the descriptive statistics of the 
outsourcing activities, we find that 74.7% of the companies do not outsource R&D. 
National outsourcing is the most common type of outsourcing. Approximately 3% of 
the firms outsource internationally, but only 0.6% outsource internationally only.
In the second part of Table 1, we show the influence of international and 
national R&D outsourcing on the likelihood of introducing new products and new
processes (estimated with a bivariate probit model): Columns (i) and (ii) show the 
results for the whole sample, columns (iii) and (iv) for firms in low-tech and medium 
low-tech sectors, and columns (v) and (vi) for high-tech and medium high-tech sectors.
                                               
8 See, for example, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) or Mohnen and Röller (2005). In our case, we test 
four equations: two for product and process innovations, for exporters and non-exporters, respectively. 
We also test the four equations for firms in low-tech or medium low-tech and for firms in high-tech and 
medium high-tech sectors.
5The estimated correlation coefficient  is always positive and significant, which 
indicates that product and process innovations are influenced by a common 
unobservable factor, and that the bivariate model is the appropriate estimation method. 
Marginal effects are reported in square brackets.
Our results show that the impact of international R&D outsourcing on firms’
probabilities of innovating is never negative. We find that international R&D 
outsourcing increases the probability of innovating by more than 30% (see, for example,
the marginal effects in column (ii) for exporters). However, an inspection of the data 
shows that there is firm heterogeneity:
 We find that irrespective of R&D outsourcing exporters are more likely to 
innovate than the average firm. In addition, exporters that outsource R&D only 
internationally are approximately 18% to 37% more likely to innovate than the average 
firm, as shown by the marginal effects in columns (i) and (ii). R&D outsourcing 
increases process innovations relatively more than product innovations. The results in 
low and medium low-tech sectors are similar to those for the whole sample. In high-tech
and medium high-tech sectors, international R&D outsourcing influences the 
probability of innovating positively, especially when combined with national 
outsourcing (columns (v) and (vi)). 
 For non-exporters, R&D outsourcing increases process innovation relatively 
more than product innovation (columns (i), and (ii), respectively, with similar results in 
columns (iii) and (iv)). Companies with only national or only international R&D 
outsourcing are 22% more likely to introduce new processes than the average firm
(column (ii)). As can be seen in columns (v) and (vi), the impact of only international 
outsourcing on the probability of innovating is negligible in high-tech and medium 
high-tech sectors, unless it is combined with national outsourcing. Only national 
6outsourcing increases the probability of introducing new products by 21% and new 
processes by 14%. 
Finally in the bottom part of Table 1, we report the p-values for the null 
hypotheses of equality, ki , and their 95% confidence intervals. For product innovation, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality. For the whole sample in low-tech or 
medium low-tech sectors, we reject the null hypothesis of equality for process 
innovation (p-values range from 0.036 to 0.003) and kc is negative. In this case,
international and national R&D outsourcing are substitutes. This result suggests that the 
marginal impact of international outsourcing on process innovation is lower when the
firm is also outsourcing nationally. In high-tech and medium high-tech sectors, we 
cannot reject equality.
4. Concluding remarks
Our results suggest that in high-tech sectors concerns about an erosion of 
national competencies due to R&D outsourcing do not seem justified9. International 
R&D outsourcing can be of great importance for companies exposed to foreign markets: 
it increases innovation, especially when combined with national outsourcing. In low-
tech and medium low-tech sectors, international and national outsourcing appear to be
substitutes as determinants of process innovation. However, only a small number of 
companies outsource R&D internationally without outsourcing nationally, which 
suggests that national outsourcing can be a necessary strategy in order to outsource 
internationally.
                                               
9 Griffith et al. (2006) get a conclusion similar to ours in their analysis on productivity of affiliates of UK 
firms in the U.S.
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8Table 1: Descriptive statistics, estimation results, and tests.
Descriptive
statistics                                                                                Bivariate probit estimation                                                                                             
All firms All firms Low-tech & medium low-tech sectors High-tech & medium high-tech sectors
Mean Std. E. (i) Product innovation (ii) Process innovation (iii) Product innovation (iv) Process innovation (v) Product innovation (vi) Process innovation
R&D outsourcing: Coeff dy/dx S. E. Coeff dy/dx S. E. Coeff dy/dx S. E. Coeff dy/dx S.E. Coeff dy/dx S. E. Coeff dy/dx S. E. 
  Exporters
  Only national (d) 8.9% 0.28 0.65 [0.24] *** 0.05 0.92 [0.32] *** 0.05 0.75 [0.29] *** 0.06 1.12 [0.37] *** 0.06 0.95 [0.24] *** 0.08 0.64 [0.22] *** 0.07
  Only international (d) 0.3% 0.06 0.49 [0.18] ** 0.20 1.22 [0.37] *** 0.21 0.65 [0.25] ** 0.26 1.99 [0.46] *** 0.38 0.76 [0.19] ** 0.29 0.65 [0.22] ** 0.27
  National and international (d) 1.3% 0.11 0.68 [0.25] *** 0.11 0.92 [0.31] *** 0.11 0.59 [0.23] *** 0.15 1.12 [0.36] *** 0.16 1.17 [0.25] *** 0.16 0.69 [0.23] *** 0.13
  No R&D outsourcing (d) 22.1% 0.41 0.22 [0.09] *** 0.04 0.54 [0.21] *** 0.04 0.30 [0.12] *** 0.05 0.72 [0.27] *** 0.05 0.57 [0.17] *** 0.07 0.29 [0.11] *** 0.06
  Non-exporters
  Only national (d) 13.2% 0.34 0.19 [0.07] *** 0.05 0.58 [0.22] *** 0.05 0.32 [0.13] *** 0.05 0.83 [0.30] *** 0.05 0.76 [0.21] *** 0.07 0.38 [0.14] *** 0.07
  Only international (d) 0.3% 0.06 -0.06 [-0.02] 0.17 0.61 [0.22] *** 0.16 0.12 [0.04] 0.19 0.87 [0.30] *** 0.19 0.43 [0.12] 0.27 0.37 [0.13] 0.26
  National and international (d) 1.2% 0.11 0.07 [0.03] 0.09 0.49 [0.18] *** 0.08 0.34 [0.13] *** 0.10 0.80 [0.28] *** 0.10 0.50 [0.14] *** 0.13 0.25 [0.09] * 0.12
  No R&D outsourcing (d) 52.6% 0.50 -0.15 [-0.06] *** 0.04 0.27 [0.11] *** 0.04 -0.01 [-0.01] 0.04 0.45 [0.18] *** 0.04 0.44 [0.15] *** 0.07 0.20 [0.07] *** 0.06
R&D expenditures/ sales 0.09 0.34 0.55 [0.22] *** 0.05 0.11 [0.04] ** 0.05 0.78 [0.30] *** 0.08 0.13 [0.05] * 0.07 0.26 [0.09] *** 0.06 0.03 [0.01] 0.05
(R&D expenditures/ sales)2 -0.05 [-0.02] *** 0.01 -0.01 [0.01] ** 0.01 -0.09 [-0.03] *** 0.01 -0.02 [-0.07] * 0.01 -0.02 [-0.01] *** 0.08 -0.01 [-0.01] 0.01
Obstacles to innovate:
  Lack of finance 0.67 0.47 -0.13 [-0.05] *** 0.02 -0.12 [-0.05] *** 0.02 -0.14 [-0.05] *** 0.02 -0.12 [-0.05] *** 0.02 -0.10 [-0.03] *** 0.03 -0.09 [-0.03] ** 0.03
  Lack of personnel 0.68 0.46 -0.12 [-0.05] *** 0.02 -0.08 [-0.03] *** 0.02 -0.14 [-0.05] *** 0.03 -0.12 [-0.05] *** 0.03 -0.09 [-0.03] ** 0.04 0.01 [0.01] 0.03
  Lack of information 0.61 0.49 -0.24 [-0.10] *** 0.02 -0.24 [-0.09] *** 0.02 -0.24 [0.09] *** 0.03 -0.03 [-0.12] *** 0.03 -0.23 [-0.07] *** 0.04 -0.08 [-0.03] ** 0.03
  Not needed 0.78 0.42 -0.07 [-0.03] *** 0.02 -0.10 [-0.04] *** 0.02 -0.05 [-0.02] ** 0.03 -0.15 [-0.06] *** 0.03 -0.09 [-0.03] ** 0.04 0.01 [0.01] 0.04
Rho 0.44 *** 0.01 0.48 *** 0.01 0.33 *** 0.01
Observations 20,673 13,606 7,067
Tests: Coeff Conf. Interval Coeff Conf. Interval Coeff Conf. Interval Coeff Conf Interval Coeff Conf. Interval Coeff Conf. Interval
Exporters
  Null hypothesis of equality p-value=0.307 p-value=0.003 p-value=0.085 p-value=0.004 p-value=0.906 p-value=0.285
,1,1 ,0,1 ,1,0 ,0,0
e e e e e
i i i i i        -0.22    [-0.66,0.21] -0.67     [-1.13,-0.22] -0.51     [-1.11, 0.07] -1.17     [-1.98, -0.37] 0.04       [-0.60, 0.68] -0.32     [-0.91, 0.27]
Non-exporters
  Null hypothesis of equality p-value=0.243 p-value=0.013 p-value=0.605 p-value=0.036 p-value=0.411 p-value=0.289
,1,1 ,0,1 ,1,0 ,0,0
n n n n n
i i i i i        -0.20      [-0.53,0.14] -0.42         [-0.76,-0.08] -0.11     [-0.52, 0.30] -0.45     [-0.87, -0.03] -0.24     [-0.82, 0.34] -0.30     [-0.86, 0.25]
Note: Estimations without constant. All regressions include size, regional, and time dummies. Industry dummies are included in columns (i) and (ii). Marginal effects (dy/dx) from the bivariate probit model 
(at sample means) are reported in square brackets. S. E.: Estimated standard error. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The symbol (d) denotes dummy variable. The 
classification of sectors follows the Eurostat/OECD (2007) classification. Interval is the 95% confidence interval for ki . National and international outsourcing are complements if ,1,1 ,0,1 ,1,0 ,0,0n n n ni i i i      .
If ,1,1 ,0,1 ,1,0 ,0,0
n n n n
i i i i      , then they are substitutes.
